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The bombings of the American embassies in Dar El Salam and Nairobi only confirmed 
what the British public ‘knew’ all along: Islamic fundamentalists – often simply 
thought of as ‘Muslims’ - are responsible for the bloodshed of innocent civilians. 
Subsequently, Britain, like many other European countries and North America 
experienced yet another series of racist outbursts equating terrorism with Islam. In light 
of these ongoing demonisations of Muslims and Islam, it is imperative to find forceful 
and creative arguments and practices to counter this increasingly widespread form of 
bigotry. 
It is with this need and urgency in mind that I read Bobby Sayyid’s recently 
published book A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism 
(1997). This certainly is not another fear-mongering sensationalist outburst about 
bloodthirsty Muslims. Quite the contrary. It is one of the most comprehensive attempts 
by a British scholar to counter negative and paranoid portrayals of Islamism.  
And here perhaps some background is needed. Western depictions of ‘the East’, 
have often represented ‘the West’ as having exclusive property in modernity, with the 
effect that non-western ideas, movements, institutions and political systems (Islam 
among them) are inferiorized – at best that they are ‘traditional’, at worst ‘backward’ 
and barbaric’. It is an arrogant put-down that has become known in this academic field 
as ‘orientalism’. Sayyid’s project is to expose orientalism with respect to analyses of 
Islamism and to ‘de-centre the West’. 
So far, so fair. The trouble is that Sayyid builds up Islamism as the only viable 
alternative to western imperialism. This is factually wrong. And it is politically 
dangerous –for people living in far less safe and comfortable circumstances than 
Sayyid. It  sells out the many women and men in ‘Muslim societies’ who are not only 
sturdy anti-imperialists but also secular.  
When I discussed Sayyid’s argument with feminists and human rights activists 
in Egypt, a country with growing Islamist movements, the outrage was coupled with a 
sense of deja vu. Bobby Sayyid is a sociology lecturer and the director of the Centre for 
the Study of Globalisation, Eurocentrism & Marginality at Manchester University. His 
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book drops into the midst of the political battles of the local, lived realities of these 
activists, wearing the dust jacket of a western publishing house. So here was another 
western scholar giving himself the right to decide what would classify as ‘authentic’ 
and what would be a ‘western import’. To them it looked just like one more front on 
which they had to struggle. 
 Sayyid positions himself clearly outside and critical of orientalist accounts that 
explain the ‘Muslim world’ exclusively in terms of Islam, its majority religion. That is 
‘essentialism’. What happens next though is that he himself adopts the essentialism – 
although one could be forgiven for missing this because he hides it in dense 
postmodernist code. Islam, he says, is a ‘master signifier’. And so it acquires, in his 
hands, an unchanging and singular essence. All sense of diversity, of historical 
development, goes out of the window.  
And this is specially paradoxical because Sayyid says in the same breath that 
‘there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent 
elements and relationships are historically specific, but because the definition is itself 
the historical product of discursive processes’1 (p.15). This passage occurs in that 
moment in the book where he takes issue with Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval-Davis for 
the way they use ‘fundamentalism’ as an analytical category in their book on women 
and religious fundamentalism in Britain2. For Sayyid they are two more in a line of 
‘western feminists’ who see the world through a narrow lens of self-righteousness. To 
anyone familiar with these authors the attack is bewildering and distressing. These are 
both members of a London-based group of activists and writers called Women Against 
Fundamentalism (WAF). They are a group of feminists of highly varied cultural, 
national and religious background, well known for their effective campaign against all 
forms of politico-religious extremism, and also their strong stand against racism, 
essentialism and eurocentrism. WAF have made clear from the start that they are not 
primarily critical of Islamic fundamentalism, but have mobilised against the oppression 
of women in the sexual and family politics of all forms of authoritarian patriarchal 
religious movements, not excluding Hinduism, Judaism and both Protestant and 
Catholic Christianity. It takes a good deal of inventiveness to be able, as Sayyid does, to 
                                                 
1  Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Disciplines and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993.  
2 Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval-Davis ‘Introduction: Fundamentalism, Multiculturalism 
and Women in Britain’, in G. Saghal and N. Yuval-Davis (eds.) Refusing Holy Orders: 
Women and Fundementalism in Britain, Virago, London, 1992.  
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misrepresent them so thoroughly as to be able to write them off as modernist, 
ethnocentrist and endorsing ‘the homogeneity of the female subject’ (p.10). 
Sayyid takes issue with the use of the word ‘fundamentalist’ by WAF and others 
as a western misrepresentation of current Islamist movements. WAF for their part argue 
that there are similarities and connections between political religious conservative 
movements in these various religions and the way they operate in both western and 
non-western, Islamo-phobic and Islamist societies, that justify its use. Certainly, the 
term carries a heavy load, as the western media muddy the water by eliding Islam and 
fundamentalism. But when WAF uses the term ‘fundamentalism’ it is always made 
clear that it is intended in the plural, and not only Islamic fundamentalism is in question. 
And I would suggest that endorsing the term or looking for an alternative is perhaps less 
important than simply recognising (and warning) that extremist chauvinist and 
patriarchal movements can be found in any religion, are increasingly present in many, 
and that they are all damaging to women. 
It is important to add that asserting continuity and connection in the way WAF 
does, does not necessarily suggests that coherence exists at all levels. Quite the contrary, 
politico-religious movements differ from one religion to another, and vary within any 
one of them. WAF’s work has involved looking at the close detail to see just what these 
differences are and how they affect women. 
But this is not in any case of much interest to Sayyid, who ignores the different 
origins of Islamist movements, their varied ideologies, strategies, organisational forms 
and political and economic contexts. A sketchy mention at the very end of the book, 
where he acknowledges that ‘there are many variations in Islamism as there are Islamist 
movements’, is clearly an afterthought. In the body of his argument, Islamism is one 
thing and one thing only, and its emergence has one source. 
And that source is the thrust to de-centre the West. It is a mono-causal 
explanation, featuring purely and simply resistance to eurocentrism (p.155). Sayyid 
overlooks all the varied and specific social, economic and political circumstances that 
have contributed to the emergence of Islamism country by country. A complex 
phenomenon is reduced to singularity. 
Sayyid does not examine in his book any actual examples of writings, speeches, 
pamphlets or interviews with Islamists. Nor does he probe in any depth actual Islamist 
politics and their concrete manifestation. He is, in fact, out of touch with local realities 
and material circumstances, especially those of women. Instead he bases his argument 
on an analysis of secondary literature, writings about Islamism. 
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 One effect of this distance from lived reality is that he sometimes fails to catch 
the discrepancy between practice and rhetoric. For instance, Islamist Iran surprised 
many by endorsing a series of secularising laws and practices that were at times clearly 
in contradiction with the shari’a. Take for instance Khomeini’s 1988 decree that gave 
Islamic government the power to ‘ suspend or alter any element of religious rules or 
worship, even prayer and fasting’.3 Sayyid simply does not detect such a gap between 
religious pretensions and pragmatic policies. 
In representing the contemporary emergence of Islamism as nothing more than 
a move to ’de-centre the West’ Sayyid gives overwhelming importance to ‘the West’ in 
the thinking of other regions. Islamist political actors are portrayed as merely motivated 
by the impetus of ‘not being western’ rather than acting on and reacting to other local 
factors such as economic and social malaise within specific countries, oppressive 
regimes and lack of political participation, or failures of secular ideologies, such as 
liberalism or socialism. The list of possible causes is long, but Sayyid dismisses various 
arguments as not adequately explaining why the challenge to the existing order has 
repeatedly and consistently taken the form of Islamic revivalism (p.5). But this is what 
Sami Zubaida calls reading history backwards. That is what Sayyid does: ‘to ignore or 
dismiss the secular and secularising forces, institutions and practices in the modern 
history of the Middle East and the lengthy episodes in which nationalist, liberal and 
leftist politics dominated’.4  
 There is one instance in his book where Sayyid does look in depth at an actual 
historical moment in a given local context: the secularising forces and programmes in 
Turkey after the abolition of the caliphate under Mustapha Kemal Ataturk in 1924. 
Modernisation, secularisation, nationalism and westernization merged into a discourse 
and practice known as ‘Kemalism’. Sayyid characterises Kemalism by the belief that 
Turkey had to emulate European culture, practices and values in order to achieve 
progress and ‘become modern’. Islam was seen by Ataturk as a hindrance on the path to 
modernity. Secularisation did not stop at the separation of religion and state but 
included ‘the liberation of the individual mind from Islamic concepts and practices’ 
(Shaw, 1977:383; quoted in Sayyid, p.64).5 
                                                 
3  Sami Zubaida, 1993:xxiii 
4  Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People & the State: Political Ideas & Movements in the 
Middle East. I.B. Tauris, London, 1993:xiii 
 
5 A consistent flaw in treatises about authoritarian regimes in Muslim societies has been 
the equation of increased state control over religion and religious authorities with 
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 It is a reasoned and vivid account. But why does Sayyid choose Kemalism as 
though it were the only secular paradigm in the Muslim world? It was, in fact, an 
exception, an anomaly, not the rule. Unlike any other secular model in the Middle East 
and the Muslim world it was inspired by and based on the French concept of laicisme. 
One could draw on other Arab postcolonial projects, such as socialism and Arab 
nationalism, where the disassociation from Islam has never been as extreme as in 
Kemalism. What about Nasserism, Marxism, Ba’athism and the various forms of 
liberalism that, while not religious, have strongly countered western hegemony and 
imperialism? By neglecting these other and varied secular trends Sayyid betrays those 
secular intellectuals and political activists in Muslim societies who have devoted their 
lives to the struggle against western hegemony. 
In his discussion of Kemalism, Sayyid presupposes, first, that there is only one 
definition of Islam among Christians and it is orientalist; and second, that there is only 
one model of secularism within Christianity. In both of these things he is mistaken. He 
writes that ‘the “Christian” (orientalist) definition of Islam removed it from the 
public-political domain’ and that ‘this notion of religion was modelled using the 
specific characteristics of Christianity as an exemplar’ (p.64). But there was no natural 
and inherent link between Christianity and secularism, understood as the separation of 
religion and the state. This is to make Islam unique and singular. And to ignore the 
development of secularism in different historical contexts. And to overlook the many 
changing manifestations of secularism in predominantly Christian countries today. 
 Just how does Sayyid position himself? He is a scholar working and writing in 
an institution located in ‘the West’. Does he acknowledge himself as part of it, or does 
he suppose he stands outside this context? And how does he relate to the many 
intellectuals and political activists who from within ‘the West’ criticise the arrogant 
orientalism all too common in its hegemonic discourses and in its practices? He fuses 
Christianity with a very particular understanding and practise of secularism. And he 
ignores non-Christian groups within this so-called West, including of course a growing 
number of Muslim minorities in Europe and North America. He forgets, besides, that 
political Islamic movements are not geographically limited to ‘Muslim societies’ 
outside the West but are present and vocal within it.  
                                                                                                                                            
secularism. No doubt, Ataturk introduced secularising laws and policies, but one has to 
distinguish between the process of secularisation and increased state control over the 
religious sphere with secularism.  
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Sayyid’s book is an exasperating read because of the way he remains locked in 
the very dichotomies he says he wants to deconstruct. He winds up essentializing 
Islamism in what is really quite an orientalist mode. And to suggest that the only thing 
Islamist movements respond to is ‘the West’ is nothing if not ‘west-centred’. Once his 
arguments are stripped of their dense postmodernist jargon they can be seen as being 
just what he himself most rightly loathes: ‘eurocentric’. 
The book is also a dismaying read. In countries and communities with strong 
Islamist tendencies there are brave academics and activists (and they are often both 
simultaneously) who are struggling on many fronts at the same time: against 
authoritarian state regimes, patriarchal politics and imperialist encroachment. By his 
unsympathetic and superficial treatment of them Sayyid adds to the risks they take. 
The secular women I studied and worked with in Egypt (and there are countless 
others like them all over the ‘Muslim world’) left me in no doubt that their political 
activism includes the struggle against imperialism. No way would they accept the 
charge that they imitate ‘the West’. They point to long traditions of secular thinking 
within their own society. When Sayyid writes them off as selling out to ‘the West’, 
betraying ‘indigenous’ movements, he is doing just what he so bitterly blames others 
for doing. He is countering stereotypes and misconceptions current in ‘the West’. But 
he is doing it by essentializing Islamism, failing to see diversity in it and within ‘the 
West’ and ultimately playing into the destructive process of ‘othering’ the other. The 
book leaves me with the disturbing feeling that the eurocentrism Sayyid criticises in 
others’ work is alive and active in his own, having slipped in by the backdoor. 
 
 
 
 
(2,244 Words)   
